Examining the Contribution of Critical Visualisation to Information Security by Hall, Peter et al.
Examining the Contribution of Critical Visualisation to
Information Security
Peter Hall
Griffith University, Queensland
College of Art
QLD4101, Australia
+61737353158
peter@peterahall.com
Claude Heath
Royal Holloway, University of
London
TW200EX, UK
+441783443084
claude.heath@rhul.ac.uk
Lizzie Coles-Kemp
Royal Holloway, University of
London
TW200EX, UK
+441783443084
lizzie.coles-
kemp@rhul.ac.uk
Axel Tanner
IBM Research Division
CH 8803, Rueschlikon,
Switzerland
+41447248249
axs@zurich.ibm.com
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the use of visualisations in the field of
information security and in particular focuses on the prac-
tice of information security risk assessment. We examine the
current roles of information security visualisations and place
these roles in the wider information visualisation discourse.
We present an analytic lens which divides visualisations into
three categories: journalistic, scientific and critical visuali-
sations. We then present a case study that uses these three
categories of visualisations to further support information
security practice.
Two significant results emerge from this case study: (1)
visualisations that promote critical thinking and reflection (a
form of critical visualisation) support the multi-stakeholder
nature of risk assessment and (2) a preparatory stage in risk
assessment is sometimes needed by service designers in order
to establish the service design before conducting a formal
risk assessment.
The reader is invited to explore the images in the digital
version of this paper where they can zoom in to particular
aspects of the images and view the images in colour.
CCS Concepts
•Human-centered computing → Visualization the-
ory, concepts and paradigms; Participatory design; Com-
puter supported cooperative work; Graphical user interfaces;
•Security and privacy → Social aspects of security and
privacy;
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1. INTRODUCTION
We are witnessing an explosion in the use of data visual-
isation tools, and many contemporary information security
research projects include a visualisation component, often as
a means to accessibly communicate scientific results. Yet,
visualisation offers more than accessible communication of
scientific results. When considered as a process of framing,
gathering, selecting, arraying and presenting data, visualisa-
tions also offer their viewers the possibility of both compre-
hending scientific facts and exploring the social and cultural
context in which the scientific facts are situated. Whilst in-
formation security visualisations often focus on the commu-
nication of the scientific, there are also examples of visuali-
sations providing a means of scientific exploration. However,
information security visualisations rarely communicate the
circumstances in which the represented scientific facts were
produced. Facts are embedded within a particular cultural
and social context and it is this situatedness that brings with
it multiple perspectives and value systems. Drawing from a
humanities discourse, this paper contends that understand-
ing the social and cultural situatedness of information se-
curity facts and figures is fundamental to risk assessment
and our understanding of risk as a socially-constructed phe-
nomenon [1]. Human Computer Interaction scholar Paul
Dourish highlights that risks are emergent from the meeting
in time and space of people, information and activities and
therefore, we would argue, the depicting the situatedness of
information security risk is vital:
Indeed, it may be inherently implausible for typ-
ical users to specify, in advance of particular cir-
cumstances, what their security needs might be;
those needs arise only as a result of specific en-
counters between people, information, and activ-
ities [12].
The socially learned aspect of risk is further highlighted by
Douglas and Wildavsky [10]:
Common values lead to common fears (and by
implication, to a common agreement not to fear
other things) [...] In the meantime, acting in the
present to ward off future dangers, each social
arrangement elevates some risks to a high peak
and depresses others to below sight. This cul-
tural bias is integral to social organisation.
It is therefore important to be able to examine the cultural
and social context in which risk facts are presented and, as
our case study shows, visualisation offers a valuable tool to
support such examination.
Visualisations help us to move between different paradigms
of knowledge-production ranging from the positivist (where
scientific knowledge is assumed to be the only valid form) to
the hermeneutic (allowing older, situated and interpretive
forms of knowledge). The concept of paradigms and the no-
tion that there are different, rival paradigms of knowledge
production is adapted from a post-empiricist account of sci-
ence initiated by Thomas Kuhn [24], who endeavoured to
explain how prevailing conventions of “normal science” are
periodically challenged by “extraordinary science,” when ri-
val paradigms are proposed. An overview of developments in
post-empiricist philosophy and science by Bernstein [2] ar-
gues that Kuhn’s position is better understood not as a rela-
tivist position but as the recovery of a hermeneutic method,
which does not abandon the appeal to evidence or strength
of claims to truth, but situates such claims with its“thematic
emphasis on understanding and interpretation” (p.30).
In terms of visualisation practice, a positivist approach
seeks to further a global standard of representation based
on a universal model of cognition. In professional design
discourse, this trajectory commonly links back to the influ-
ence of Otto Neurath’s pictorial statistics, and his motto
that “words divide, pictures unite” [30]. A hermeneutic ap-
proach, on the other hand, acknowledges the situatedness of
the knowledge producer and visualisation designer, and their
respective ontologies and systems of knowledge production.
Johanna Drucker’s work has been particularly influential in
challenging positivism in information design and interactive
design discourse, drawing instead from the humanities and
digital humanities. A strenuous critical tradition can be
found in geography and cartography, where visualisation (as
maps) has a rich history: for instance, Neurath’s motto is
challenged by a critical position articulated by J.B. Harley
[19], who, after J.H. Parry, saw maps as “slippery witnesses”
(p.30). Several recent works, including mapping and Geo-
graphic Information System (GIS) texts by Denis Wood [43]
and Jeremy Crampton [9] help to develop a critical approach
to cartography; a field of study and practice that is emerging
amid amateur, open-source and experimental practices.
Broadly speaking, visualisation is produced in one of three
contexts of practice: journalistic, scientific and critical [18],
where journalistic visualisation communicates a finding or
a conclusion as clearly and succinctly as possible; scien-
tific visualisation presents the viewer with a scientific pat-
tern or data and invites the viewer to explore the output of
the science; and critical visualisation where predominantly
artistic techniques are used to invite the viewer to critique
the underpinning assumptions, paradigms and philosophy
of the narrative communicated via visualisation. Of the
Figure 1: The mobile categories of visualisation.
three, critical visualisation is the most clearly aligned with
a hermeneutic approach, in that it seeks to draw attention
to the sociology of scientific knowledge, i.e., in what circum-
stances it was produced (Fig. 1). 1
1.1 Examples of the three types of
visualisation
Fig. 2 shows examples of scientific visualisations, detail-
ing graph representations of IT infrastructure elements and
access control patterns, clarifying and detailing in an analyt-
ical manner the novel descriptions in the respective articles.
By contrast, Fig. 3 uses a journalistic visualisations to com-
municate the results of scientific exploration; namely the
groups of security incidents by attack types and attacked
industry sectors. These figures represent types of visualisa-
tion that are typically used as part of information security
practice and research.
Fig. 5 uses a critical visualisation to invite the viewer to
compare public risk perception with the scientific quantifica-
tion of bio-hazard risks. In this visualisation the culturally
and socially situated nature of risk perception is compared
with the scientific analysis of the risk. This visualisation was
produced as a carpet and viewers were invited to stand on
the visualisation and physically compare their risk position
with the ones presented in the carpet 4. Such critique is
not typically invited by the more traditional scientific and
journalistic visualisations.
This paper will outline the prevailing discourse on infor-
mation visualisation, place information security visualisa-
tion within that discourse and then present a case study
1In Hall’s original paper [18] the critical visualisation is re-
ferred to as artistic, due to the intended audience of that
paper (graphic design researchers and educators), but in
applying this work to information security, the artistic cat-
egory of visualisation is more aptly described as critical, as
explained in the following section.
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Figure 3: PortGroup Operations in GROOVE .
network configuration, in particular the configuration
of port groups, virtual switches, and virtual network
interfaces. We model methods that create, modify, and
delete such network elements. Whereas a port group’s
network policy contains interesting properties, such as
whether a NIC is in promiscious mode, we omit it in favor
of a clear focus on the isolation properties of the topology.
Furthermore, we consider the creation of virtual machines.
We leave extending this subset of modeled operations, e.g.,
including storage, to future work: IT is a time-consuming
but otherwise neither challenging nor enlightening task.
However, this subset already enables the analysis of
interesting topology and configuration changes in the
areas of virtual networking and compute resources, and,
thereby, the verification of isolation breaches.
2) Modeling Approach: For any existing real-world
virtualized infrastructure like VMware, the API doc-
umentation does not o er a precise formal definition
and model, but rather a semi-formal description of the
operations, parameters as well as the preconditions and
e ects that the operations have. A contribution of this
paper is to create a formal model that allows for precise
statements to be made and proved or refuted. It is of
course not possible to formally prove the correctness of
such a model itself, however there is a methodology to
obtain a “good” model by combining two directions.
The first direction is to follow the documentation and
translate the documented e ects into our graph model.
The second is to experiment with the real implementation,
to evaluate empirically whether the actual operations
indeed a ect the infrastructure as our model predicts.
To study these experiments we need to translate the
infrastructure topology into a graph before and after the
operation has been performed, and check whether the
resulting graph transformation matches our model of the
operation.
3) Modeling Examples: Fig. 3 shows examples of the
creation, updating, and deletion of the virtual networking
of VMware. The so called port groups have a direct
impact on the network isolation of tenants as they
determine the VLAN configuration. We adopted the
visual notation of production rules from GROOVE to
specify the rules of this paper. This notation makes the
key points of our paper easy to grasp, while it has a
well-defined formal semantics. Each graph production
rule is itself described by a graph where nodes and edges
can have one of the following colors/styles:
• Readers (black): nodes and edges that need to be
matched in the graph for the rule to be applica-
ble; they are preserved in the transformation. For
example, the host node in Fig. 3a.
• Creators (bold green): newly added nodes and
edges. The lower vswitch and corresponding edges
in Fig. 3a are creators.
• Erasers (thin dashed blue): like the readers, but
will be deleted by the transformation. For instance,
the lower vswitch in Fig. 3c.
• Embargoes (bold dashed red): negative application
conditions (NAC); the rule cannot be applied if any
matching nodes and edges are present.
By combining Embargoes and Creators, we can express
a conditional new, where nodes and/or edges are only
created if they do not exist yet. For example, we make use
of conditional news in the information flow rules (Fig. 4,
§III-B1). The bold label of nodes represent their type,
e.g., a host.
Our example operations and their models are a
representation for three common classes of operations
that i) create new infrastructure elements and therefore
new nodes and edges in the graph model, ii) change
infrastructure elements’ attributes and the topology,
which translates to the addition and removal of edges to
graph nodes and to data nodes that hold the attributes’
values, iii) delete infrastructure elements and thereby also
nodes and edges in the model. Parametrized production
rules are essential as management operations operate on
a specific part of the virtualized infrastructure, e.g., on
a specific host given by a hostname parameter, and set
or change attributes based on given parameters.
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network configuration, in particular the configuration
of port groups, virtual switches, and virtual network
interfaces. We model methods that create, modify, and
delete such network elements. Whereas a port group’s
network policy contains interesting properties, such as
whether a NIC is in promiscious mode, we omit it in favor
of a clear focus on the isolation properties of the topology.
Furthermore, we consid r he creation of virtual machines.
We leave extending this subset of modeled operations, e.g.,
including storage, to future work: IT is a time-consuming
but otherwise neither challenging nor enlightening task.
However, this subset already enables the analysis of
interesting topology and configuration changes in the
areas of virtual networking and compute resources, and,
thereby, the verification of isolation breaches.
2) Modeling Approach: For any existing real-world
virtualized infrastructur like VMwar , the API doc-
umentation does not o er a precise formal definition
and model, but rather a semi-formal description of the
operations, parameters as well as the preconditions and
e ects that the operations have. A contribution of this
paper is to create a formal model that allows for precise
statements to be made and proved or refuted. It is of
course not possible to formally prove the correctness of
such a model itself, however there is a methodology to
obtain a “good” model by combining two directions.
The first direction is to follow the documentation and
translate the docum nted e ects into our graph model.
The second is to experiment with the real implementation,
to evaluate empirically whether the actual operations
indeed a ect the infrastructure as our model predicts.
To study these experiments we need to translate the
infrastructure topology into a graph before and after the
operation has been performed, and check whether the
resulting graph transformation matches our model of the
operation.
3) Modeling Examples: Fig. 3 shows examples of the
creation, updating, and deletion of the virtual networking
of VMware. The so called port groups have a direct
impact on th net ork isolation of tenants as they
determine the VLAN configuration. We adopted the
visual notation of production rules from GROOVE to
specify the rules of this paper. This notation makes the
key points of our paper easy to grasp, while it has a
well-defined formal semantics. Each graph production
rule is itself described by a graph where nodes and edges
can have one of the following colors/styles:
• Readers (black): nodes and edges that need to be
matched in the graph for the rule to be applica-
ble; they are preserved in the tra sformation. For
example, the host node in Fig. 3a.
• Creators (bold green): newly added nodes and
edges. The lower vswitch and corresponding edges
in Fig. 3a are creators.
• Erasers (thin dashed blue): lik the readers, but
will be deleted by the transformation. For instance,
the lower vswitch in Fig. 3c.
• Embargoes (bold dashed red): negative application
conditions (NAC); the rule cannot be applied if any
matching nodes and edges are present.
By combining Embargoes and Creators, we can expr ss
a conditional new, where nodes and/or edges are only
created if they do not exist yet. For example, we make use
of conditional news in the information flow rules (Fig. 4,
§III-B1). The old lab l of n des represent their type,
e.g., a host.
Our example operations and their models are a
representation for three common classes of operations
that i) create new infrastructure elements and therefore
new nodes and edges in the graph model, ii) change
infrastructure elements’ attributes a d the topology,
which translates to the addition and removal of edges to
graph nodes and to data nodes that hold the attributes’
values, iii) delete infrastructure elements and thereby also
nodes and edges in the mo el. Parametrized production
rules are essential as management operations operate on
a specific part of the virtualized infrastructure, e.g., on
a specific host given by a hostname parameter, and set
or change attributes based on given parameters.
On the Parameterized Complexity and Kernelization of the Workflow Satisfiability Problem A:23
WSP1(̸=). We now construct a bipartite graph G = (U, S;A), where A ⊆ S × U is the
authorization relation. We may assume that |U | > |S| = k.
Let V = U ∪ S. Using the well-known Hopcroft-Karp algorithm, we can find a max-
imum matching M in G in time O(
√|V ||A|).13 If M covers every vertex of S, then I is
satisfiable and our kernel is the subgraph of G induced by all vertices covered by M .
(Since there is at most one edge in M for each vertex in S and at most one edge for
each vertex in U , there are exactly k users covered and we have a kernel containing k
users.)
IfM does not cover every vertex of S then we define RG,M to be the set of vertices of
G which can be reached from some uncovered vertex in S by anM -alternating path.14
Then a result of Szeider [2004, Lemma 3] asserts that we can compute RG,M in time
O(|U |+ |S|+ |A|). We write RG,M in the form U ′ ∪ S′ for some U ′ ⊆ U nd S′ ⊆ S. The
set U ′ ∪ S′ has the following properties [Szeider 2004, Lemma 3]:
P1. All vertices of S \ S′ are covered byM ;
P2. There is no edge in G from U \ U ′ to S′ and no edge ofM joins vertices in U ′ with
vertices in S \ S′;
P3. In the subgraphG induced by U ′∪S′, vertices of a set U ′′ ⊆ U ′ have at least |U ′′|+1
neighbors in S′.
A bipartite graph G, a maximum matching M in G (indicated by the thicker lines),
and the sets U ′ and S′ are shown in Fi ure 6; the figure is based on one used
by Szeider [2004].
U
S
U ′ U \ U ′
S′ S \ S′
Fig. 6. Constructing a kernel for WSP using a maximum matching
Hence, we can ssign users to all steps that are not in S′ (using M ) and we will
not violate any separation-of-d ty constraints by d ing so. Moreover, property (P2)
means that allocating users in U ′ to steps in S′ will not violate any separation-of-duty
constraints. In other words, we have reduced the problem i stance to finding a solution
to a smaller i stance (the kernel) in which the set of users is U ′, the set of steps is S′,
and |U ′| < |S′| 6 k.
The authorization relation A ⊆ S × U defines the bipartite graph used to co struct
the matching. The computation of a maximum matching in time O(|A| · √n+ k) =
O(nk
√
n+ k) enables us to compute a partial plan π, where an edge in the matching
corresponds to a step s and a user u = π(s). If the maximum matching has cardinality
k, then we are do . Otherwise, we s lve WSP for the kernel.
When the cardinality of A is high (so the computation of the maximum matching is
relatively slow), many us rs re authorized for many steps. In this case, therefore, the
13A matching in a bipartite graph is a set of edges that are pairwise non-adjacent. A maximum ma ching
contains the largest possible number of edges.
14An M -alternating path has the pr p rty that for a y pair of succes ive edges one belongs to M and the
other does not.
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Figure 2: Examples of scientific visualisations.
Upper and middle figures taken with perm ssion
from [4], bottom figure from [8].
that demonstrates a broader rang of information e urity
visualisation . This paper will co c ude with a discussion
about he pote ti l value of widening the ran e of infor-
mation security visualisations that are used in informatio
security practice and research.
2. VISUALISATION LITERATURE
The literature related to information visualisation is va t
and we focus in this section on jour listic, scientific and
critical visualisations where they occur and on discourses
of critical car ogra hy and social sem otics which inform
such visualisations. It is important to understand the roles
of journalistic, scie tific and critical visualisations because
in robust scientific visualisation offers tools and techniques
that can be used to both evaluate and validate the science.
The analytical lens of journalistic, scientific and critical vi-
sualisations enable the examination of the scientific process.
Journalistic visualisations communicate the robustness of
the scientific discovery, scientific visu lisations make visible
the process of scientific discovery and critical visualisations
encourage of the questioning and exploration of the cultural
and social perspectives that inform the scientific discovery.
2.1 Journalistic visualisation
A journalistic approach to visualisations is important to
information security because this approach seeks to make
tangible information security risks and concerns that often
seem abstract and remote. The journalistic approach aims
to simplify and explain complex data issues, an ethos articu-
lated in Edward Tufte’s visual principles of graphical excel-
lence [40]. As the New York Times graphics director Steve
Duenes puts it: “it is our job to edit, condense and reduce”
[34]. While the art of information design can be traced to
William Playfair and in recent decades has been exempli-
fied in the printed work of professional information design-
ers. The advent of internet-based communication has meant
that journalistic visualisation is increasingly presented using
quite advanced interactive web-based forms that allow the
Figure 3: Sampling of 2014 security incidents by at-
tack types and attacked industries (reproduced with
permission from [36]).
public to xplore ata for themselves.
A well-known example of interactive journalistic visuali-
sation is Han Rosling’s Gapminder software which has been
used for animating global health data [33]. Gapminder be-
gan as an educational tool (to make university students use
and understand statistics to acquire a “fact-based” world
view), but since it ultimately seeks to inform and transform
public opinion, it can be categorized as a journalistic visu-
alisation.
Discussio of formal issues in this category tends to be
dominated by the standards codified by authorities like Tufte
a d Be Sh eiderman. Tufte [40] for instance, argues that
information graphics should show the data without distor-
tion, at several levels of detail and present many numbers
in a small space (p.13). Shneiderman, focusing on interac-
tive visualisation, argues for visual consistency, informative
feedback, a sense that the user is in control, and simple error
handling [37].
A journalistic approach to visualisation also places con-
siderable emphasis on narrative, on allowing the graphics to
“tell story” about the data. In their work on narratives
Segel and Heer [35] analyse case studies of narrative visual-
isa ion from th New York Times, the Financial Times, and
Minnesota Public Radio and argue for a balance of author-
driven and r ader-driven approach to achieve truly interac-
tive narrative visualisati .
An interactive approach to journalistic visualisation is Mar-
tin Wattenberg’s ‘Chimera’ search tool which highlights rep-
etition in texts, using graphical “skyscrapers” over the body
of the text to visualise repetition. This tool was used to find
“clone laws”- legislation pre-written for elected officials by
corporations or partisan groups [42]. This type of interac-
tive visualisatio off s information security valuable tech-
niques to compare and contrast regulatory environments,
policy environments as well as the scientific results from dif-
ferent security incident reports.
2.2 Scientific visualisation
Scientific visualisations enable the exploration of complex
data sets and promote dialogue between different scientific
communities. Since information security is inherently in-
terdisciplinary, the use of scientific visualisations promotes
dialogue about scientific fact through techniques understood
to the different communities. Peter Galison has tracked the
love-hate relationship with scientific visualisation in physics,
noting how it has been associated with intuition, and has
raised suspicion in the sciences while also enabling progress
Figure 4: Detail of ‘Risk Perception Carpet’, 1999-
2000, 4x4 m. Image courtesy of LUST, NL.
in quantum mechanics and chaotic systems [17].
Scientific visualisation is generally positioned as a tool of
discovery advanced through scientific method. An underly-
ing assumption is that the tool allows unbiased exploration
of data. Questions of visual form are generally driven by
principles derived from a cognitivist model of artificial intel-
ligence. In this form of visualisation, a universal model of
the human brain is posited and the form of the visualisation
tested for its appropriateness to the data, usability, and so
on [16].
2.3 Critical visualisation
The contention of this paper is that a third category,
which we shall call critical visualisation, presents an ap-
proach that can facilitate user-led enquiry in information
security. An earlier argument for a category of “artistic”
visualisation [18] is here adapted specifically for the instru-
mental goal of advancing visualisation in information secu-
rity beyond its predominantly technical paradigm. Critical
visualisation provides the user with tools through which to
enquire about the social and cultural perspective of the facts
presented. While it is derived from artistic practices, a criti-
cal approach to visualisation is closely aligned to the critical
cartography movement that sought to problematise the per-
vasive post-war discourse on maps that assumed their neu-
trality. The importance of the role of the arts, and therefore
of critical visualisation, has often been underestimated by
the scientific community, but from critical cartography we
learn that “map art” plays a significant role in shaping the
“field of tension” that describes contemporary mapping, GIS
and visualisation practices [9].
Examples of critical visualisation that are directly perti-
nent to information security include ‘InfoArcadia,’ an exhi-
bition about information graphics, instruction manuals, in-
formation landscapes, data clusters, and personal mapping
(Fig. 4). The Dutch design agency LUST2 was commis-
sioned to interpret researcher Paul Slovic’s data from 1988
concerning people’s perception of risks. The resulting car-
pet visualised this data as an ‘x-y matrix’ on which these
2http://lust.nl/
Figure 5: ‘Risk Perception Carpet’, 1999-2000, 4x4
m. Image courtesy of LUST, NL.
Figure 6: InfoArcadia installation shot showing the
‘Risk Perception Carpet’, 1999-2000, 4x4m. Image
courtesy of LUST, NL.
Figure 7: Uta Eisenreich, Network-Teamwork So-
ciograms, Langmatt School, Zu¨rich [15]. Image
courtesy Uta Eisenreich.
‘risks’ were mapped as ‘controllable versus uncontrollable’
and ‘known risk versus unknown risk’, also the desire of peo-
ple for strict regulation of certain risks, and the importance
of certain risks as signals to wider society (Figs. 5, and 6).
Importantly, LUST designers stated that ‘the visitor would
form the third axis (z)’, thus completing the design by ac-
tively exploring its properties.
Another example of what we are calling critical visuali-
sation, by the artist Uta Eisenreich (Fig. 7), comprises a
series of photographs of a social network diagram as created
by children at a school in Zu¨rich, Switzerland. The children
were invited to connect to each other with coloured string,
in response to prompts such as which three classmates would
they choose to invite to their birthday party. The visualisa-
tion depicts a fragile and ephemeral social network, particu-
larly relevant when the connections between nodes are estab-
lished by users and are based on intangible, contentious and
subjectively interpreted concepts such as envy. Precisely
the same adjectives could be applied to a visualisation of
perceived risk and vulnerability in a social network visuali-
sation depicting information-sharing practices. In this way,
Eisenreich’s project inherently critiques the presumed ob-
jectivity, certainty and permanency of conventional social
network diagrams.
As these examples show, critical visualisation has a role
that includes bringing to light and experimentally inverting
and re-channelling the prevailing assumptions behind the
current rhetoric of visualisation. It thereby offers new, al-
ternative modes of representation, much needed if we are
to comprehend today’s complex information security land-
scape and propose alternative paradigms. Taking a fresh
perspective on the landscape, can bring to our attention the
things seen habitually, but not truly observed. The critical
is a mode of practice especially suited to exploring the link-
ages between the technical and experiential and emotional
aspects of information security and helping the user to de-
velop a sense of situatedness.
2.4 Journalistic, scientific and critical
visualisations in concert
As Fig. 3 illustrates, time and sequencing are themes that
appear in security reports and are often represented through
the use of charts and timelines. Time is also an important
scientific variable in our calculations of risk and impact. The
variety of different visual approaches to presenting and de-
scribing time in different scientific contexts potentially pro-
vides the field of information security with a sense of how it
might start to use visualisations to deepen and question our
understanding of our field.
Dominant conceptions of time, for example, can be cri-
tiqued through visualisations that challenge the Enlighten-
ment convention of depicting time’s “progress” as a sequen-
tial line marching forward, with the present marking the
pinnacle of human achievement. [32]. The challenge of rep-
resenting temporality is particularly significant when depict-
ing the network map. The authority of the line-and-node di-
agram found in many network maps implicitly suggests that
the network depicted is fixed in time and yet when consid-
ering information security risk, understanding risk over a
period of time is often fundamental to risk analysis. Visu-
alisations need to reflect this evolution in order for analysts
and scientists to derive relevant meaning. As one group of
sociologists has noted [22]:
Most network images do a poor job of represent-
ing change in networks, and researchers make
do by presenting successive snapshots of the net-
work over time. The problem is fundamental to
the media. To effectively display the relational
structure of a social network, at least two dimen-
sions are needed to represent proximity, and that
leaves no effective space (on a printed page) to
represent time.
A simple adaptation of an existing critical approach time[13]
might lead us to focus on the representation of time in a
high-stakes, high speed information network. For example,
a security consultant’s perception and understanding of crit-
ical time values in a stock trading system might warrant a
visualisation that depicts the vulnerability caused by a mil-
lisecond delay; the same system might be depicted on a dif-
ferent temporal scale by a managerial colleague responsible
for purchasing equipment. In this way the representation of
time is relevant to the risk period in each case.
In summary, it is important to uncover the viewpoints
at work with risk visualisations in order to understand the
perspectives involved in the analysis and conclusions of mea-
sures of risk. This requires visualisations that invite the
viewer to evaluate risk (scientific visualisations), visualisa-
tions that present risk conclusions (journalistic visualisa-
tions) and visualisations that invite the viewer to explore
the beliefs and values that underpin a risk evaluation (criti-
cal visualisation). In this last category, the role of the viewer
becomes a more active part of the meaning-making process
and is encouraged to contribute to the narrative of the vi-
sualisation rather than be the recipient of a pre-determined
narrative.
The roots of combining journalistic, scientific and critical
visualisations for a more holistic approach to engaging with,
communicating and understanding science can be found in
the fields of critical cartography and social semiotics.
2.5 Critical Cartography
The field of geography has been influenced by the work of
J.B Harley [19], Denis Wood [43], and more recently Jeremy
Crampton [9], among others in critical cartography. In these
examples of fields of study in situatedness and cartography
we can see the scholarly roots of analysing the combination
of critical, scientific and story-telling or journalistic tech-
niques to situate facts and figures within cultural, social and
historical contexts.
The link between cartography and visualisation is evident
in their shared histories. Tufte and cartographic historian
Arthur Robinson have both shown that the origins of the-
matic maps are tightly entwined with cartography, extend-
ing back at least to Edmund Halley’s map of trade winds
[31]. Robinson’s seminal study provides plenty of histor-
ical evidence to support a situated understanding of the-
matic maps, as projections of particular cultures at partic-
ular times and places.
Visualisations can be critiqued in much the same way that
maps have been to reveal their situatedness in time and his-
tory. The map historian J.B. Harley showed that we must
look for a map’s “silences” to reveal their obscured agendas
- maps “exert a social influence through their omissions as
much as by the features they depict and emphasize” [19].
Similarly, today’s network maps and visualisations of sus-
picious internet activity reveal their territorial imperatives
through what is left out. Maps of the internet coming from
computer research labs in the late 1990’s, for example, tend
to perpetuate a separation of “cyberspace” from real space
by visualising network activity on a blank background. Con-
temporary visualisations of network activity use the same
formal separation of the informational from the social, which
has arguably blinded analysts to the impact of social net-
works and real space activity on security.
Maps not only represent physical and digital topographies
but also emotional topographies. For example, a diagram of
“subject matter experts” produced by management consul-
tant and network analyst Valdis Krebs in 2008 [23] reveals
its own imperatives through what is not shown. Such a vi-
sualisation is meant to help us identify the fragile nodes in a
company’s knowledge domain, the visualisation depicts peo-
ple as boxes connected by lines: they are connected if one
goes to the other for expertise, and those with many arrows
pointing to them are the “subject matter experts” sought
out often for advice. In Krebs’ diagram are assumptions
about the rate of transfer of knowledge around a network
and the organisational culture. A culture in which people
share knowledge freely in pursuit of a shared goal will lessen
the impact of a subject matter expert departing the organ-
isation, whereas an environment in which knowledge is cov-
eted as a form of power will be made potentially far more
vulnerable by the departure of a subject-matter expert. Ul-
timately, a map of the mood of the network may be more
useful than Krebs’ abstracted top-down view.
2.6 Social Semiotics
Further light can be shed on the field of security visual-
isation by considering recent discourse in the area of social
semiotics, a field closely aligned with critical cartography.
Whereas a basic application of sign-systems theory is evi-
dent in security visualisation practices, the more recent so-
cial semiotic argument that signs and symbols cannot be un-
derstood in isolation but need to be studied in light of the
social dimensions that are intrinsic to their function [21],
has yet to permeate security discourse. For example, we
might consider the fairly commonplace citation in security
visualisation texts of the visual principles of Jacques Bertin,
whose comprehensive semiology of maps and diagrams en-
deavours to establish a universal sign-system that governs
the meaningful use of graphic forms in diagrams and maps
[3]. Drawing from Bertin, for example, one recent security
visualisation text [29] states that “the human visual system
has its own rules” and that this knowledge can be trans-
lated into “rules for displaying information”. By contrast, a
social semiotic position contests that graphic forms cannot
be meaningfully studied outside of their social contexts; a
2011 study of the boundary line used in maps and visuali-
sations, for example, considers how these seemingly simple
and authoritative graphic forms have a complex, uncertain
and ambiguous nature when considered as concrete spatial
practices. The social semiotic account notes that Bertin
“does not subject the graphic figure of the line to any form
of critical investigation” [5].In another example, the physical
line used to depict the UK border in the carpet at Stansted
Airport, when scrutinised in a larger political and cultural
context, is a complex and contested figure. Similarly, the
lines used to depict potential attack paths in a security vi-
sualisation become considerably more rich and meaningful
when the lines they represent are studied in their actual,
social context.
3. VISUALISATIONS IN INFORMATION
SECURITY- THE CONTRIBUTION OF
CRITICAL VISUALISATION
Information security has not been left untouched by the
discussions and developments in data visualisation. Infor-
mation security “voices” notably James Lynne (Lead tech-
nologist, Sophos) and projects such as Cybaware and Skyrails
illustrate how data visualisation is regarded as an important
means of communicating information security facts and con-
cepts. However, the data visualisation movement of which
information security is a part typically opens no critical win-
dow on the medium being used to convey the facts and this
potentially hampers information security practice, as the sit-
uatedness of the data is often lost. It might be argued that
to highlight the assumptions, cultural values and generali-
sations in a visual mode of representation would dilute and
confuse the security message. However, for security topics,
the cultural is often fundamental. James Lyne’s TED talk in
2012 shows us very clearly that a cultural understanding of
hackers and malware developers is fundamental to the work
that companies such as Sophos do and yet, interestingly, the
visual presentation does not use visualisations that encour-
age enquiry, discussion, or critical evaluation.
With a view to developing tools and capabilities that sup-
port the presentation of security facts and figures and pro-
mote enquiry, we will now analyse the nature of visualisa-
tions in contemporary information security reports and pa-
pers.
Information security is a complex, multi-dimensional topic
that has always combined the experiential with the scientific
in a type of rich, multi-threaded tapestry. Why humans
disclose what they disclose in the way that they disclose it,
and manage information in the way that they manage it, has
as much to do with internal context (how an individual feels
about the interaction and the data), as it has to do with the
external context and the terms of the exchange [11], and any
meaning we can derive from such actions is situated with a
particular combination of internal, external and emergent
contexts.
The multi-dimensionality of security problems can be seen
clearly in the latest security vulnerability reports [28, 39, 41,
36]. These reports highlight the complexity of the security
vulnerability landscape, with vulnerabilities ranging from
software flaws that allow for SQL injection attacks, Cross
Site Scripting on the server side, but also third-party plug-
ins like Java, Adobe Flash on the client side, as well as weak
operational procedures that do not patch and correct these
flaws as part of software installation and management as
practised within an organisation. As an indication for the
latter, it is observed that still to a large extent breaches are
detected by external entities, not the organisations them-
selves, as well as a general unpreparedness to react to and
handle such breaches (the Mandiant report [28] calls them
“inevitable breaches”, as there is “no such thing as perfect
security”). Reports in the last six months also show an
increase in mobile malware, more sophisticated techniques
like RAM scraping (i.e., accessing and harvesting in memory
data) and also talk about social engineering with the focus
on phishing activities. One more observation is the increase
of “designer vulnerabilities” [36], i.e., vulnerabilities with a
branded logo, website and catchy name like ‘Heartbleed’,
‘Shellshock’, and ‘POODLE’. These often are vulnerabili-
ties in long-held foundational frameworks used by a large
part of existing websites. But still, besides the huge public-
ity of data breaches, the use of weak passwords is a major
issue and entry point for attacks.
There are a number of dominant narratives across these
reports:
• Diversity of organisations that have been affected by
information security breaches,
• Persistence of certain software flaws,
• Cultivation of attack surfaces across platforms that
previously had not been successfully targeted by at-
tackers, and
• Significance of poor security practices.
However, the visualisations in these reports do not reflect
these dominant narratives. Instead the narrative told by the
visualisations is mostly that of the comparison between the
volumes of particular types of attack, year on year. These
conclusions are presented in journalistic form as the results
of scientific enquiry. The types of visualisation that are used
to display these results are from the scientific tradition: bar
charts or other forms of chart that enable volume compari-
son, timelines, and process flows dominate the presentation.
Only one report [36] includes a pointer to online versions of
visualisations allowing further interactive journalistic explo-
ration. 3
The reports are mostly text-heavy, though the Trustwave
report [39] embeds this into strongly coloured illustrative
graphics. They convey additional narratives that are re-
lated to the social and organisational aspects of the current
3An interactive version of the journalistic visualisation
shown in Fig. 3 allowing for further exploration of the data is
available at http://www-03.ibm.com/security/xforce/xfisi
security vulnerability landscape, e.g., all reports communi-
cate a narrative of poor security practices leading to vul-
nerabilities, and some try to illustrate these narratives with
visualisations of the involved components and a timeline.
However, organisationally oriented narratives are difficult
to present in a simple journalistic form and, when rooted in
the scientific tradition, struggle to represent the nuances of
organisationally defined narratives.
One well-known report published in 2013 [27] presents
very extensively a long-standing attack and contains some
visualisations that attempt to explain how attacks take place,
the lifecycle of a persistent and thorough attack, and the
context in which attacks take place. These are visualisations
that follow journalistic rather than scientific traditions and
yet the narrative is highly simplistic and does not convey
the social sophistication or complexity of these attacks.
Only one report [41] starts to ask some critical questions
about the available data and the conclusions to draw from
them for the root causes of data breaches, but still mostly,
across the reports reviewed, the user is not invited to ques-
tion or evaluate the material presented in the reports. The
visualisations are used to re-enforce and augment the credi-
bility of the data that is presented in the report rather than
to invite engagement and allow for a range of perspectives.
The images that are used and the construction of the visu-
alisations are all designed to communicate strength in the
scientific results and yet these reports leave many questions
unanswered, including:
• How is the security of SMEs evaluated?
• Why do poor security practices persist?
• Why are trusted third parties not more rigorously vet-
ted?
• What variables are collected in the scientific process,
and why?
• Were the same methods used for collection in previous
years as were used in later years?
Excluding such questions reduces the possibility for users
to situate the visualisations, explore the value of the scien-
tific conclusions and removes the possibility for the inclusion
of the user perspective. In order to develop visualisations
that do promote viewer engagement and encourage debate
and critique, we must look to the field of visualisation and
explore the different techniques that are available.
The presentation of the narratives in the report contrasts
heavily with the importance of the socio-cultural factors that
are used in risk analysis. For example, James Lyne’s verbal
delivery places an emphasis upon the fundamentally situated
nature of security vulnerabilities and attacks. This might be
construed as a journalistic tactic to make abstract domains
intelligible for non-technical audiences, however Lyne’s em-
phasis upon socio-cultural factors is grounded in a deep un-
derstanding of the importance of situating information se-
curity facts and figures in their full social and organisational
contexts. Lyne’s stories of hacking and malware manifest an
expert interweaving of the social, organisational and techni-
cal dimensions of context, which in turn suggests that the
act of unifying them in this way, is potentially a rewarding
(and equally scientific) route for security visualisations to
explore.
It could therefore be argued that for these visualisations
to mature, an improved cross-fertilisation between the three
contexts of visualisation practice is required. The journalis-
tic practice of making data accessible and legible has much to
teach the sciences; and the novel forms and critiques of more
creative or exploratory representations can inform, question,
and reinvigorate the scientific and journalistic types of visu-
alisation.
4. IPTV: CASE STUDY
This section outlines a risk assessment case study that
used journalistic, scientific and critical visualisations in the
assessment process. The focus of the case study was a Small
to Medium Enterprise (SME) that specialises in the delivery
of micro-payments services to small businesses and house-
holds. The risk assessment process was used with the SME
to plan the design of a micro-payment service to be delivered
using Internet-Protocol TV (IPTV) in order to enable low
income families to make payments and manage their money
using the television as the interface.
4.1 Service background
IPTV has a wide user-community demographic, and the
planned service is particularly aimed at users without access
to or distrustful of computers and other smart devices. The
target user community also contains wildly fluctuating levels
of digital and educational literacy. For a variety of reasons
these users may be inclined to either withhold or share their
personal information and data at different times and un-
der different pressures, pressures that threaten to digitally
exclude them from the wider community. In addition, with-
holding behaviour reduces the likelihood of compliance with
the service security requirements. In their use of a service
such as IPTV, these users may be extremely vulnerable to
abuse of the system, perhaps carried out by other members
of the community or from their own carers and family.
Gathering data as part of the risk assessment process is
strewn with difficulties due to the enhanced sensitivities
of these situations and the complexities of the social ar-
rangements around them. This difficulty is specifically com-
pounded in the case of IPTV, where a full technical speci-
fication of the service has not yet been reached (tests being
confined to small viability trials, at the time of writing).
4.2 Overview of the method
In the case study we visited the SME five times over a
twelve-month period (Table 1). Initial data was gathered
and a baseline risk assessment was carried out in order to
establish which controls had been designed into the service,
and where gaps in these controls still existed. The base-
line risk assessment was primarily aimed at modelling the
service from the perspective of the service’s technological
infrastructure, and did not make reference to the perspec-
tives of the target user communities, or to any of the social
practices that could potentially be used to protect data in
the everyday course of events. In order to derive this type
of socially determined data, an initial briefing meeting was
held with management to establish the prime focus of the
service and to ascertain the nature of its relation towards
future users. Four workshops followed, attended by a core
of three participants with others joining at different times.
4.3 Use of visualisations
Figure 8: Formal graphical modelling of the infras-
tructure of the IPTV case study. This employs
theArchiMate Open Group risk taxonomy.
The initial baseline assessment of this prospective service
led to it being formally modelled with existing enterprise
architecture analysis tools (Fig. 8). This successfully con-
veyed the results of the baseline assessment in so far as it
represents the service as a stable, purely technological ser-
vice, with clearly defined components. However, adopting
the perspective described in the discussion of critical car-
tography (and, by extension, critical visualisation) above,
it becomes apparent that such a visualisation promotes the
sense that the service is clearly defined at all times, and
that all the components are known, which is not always the
case. It was noticeable that the case study participants (the
service providers) did not recognise this visualisation when
it was subsequently presented at the management briefing.
This lack of recognition was due to the type of language that
was used, which maintained the technological and structural
depiction of the service. In particular, the visualisations are
devoid of any meaningful representation of mutual human
engagement, a fact which is at odds with a service that is
fundamentally based on the social networks that are already
in place in the communities for which the service was in-
tended.
In order to include actors in the service depiction, a hy-
brid journalistic-scientific visualisation was produced and is
shown in Fig. 9. This attempts something akin to a journal-
istic simplification, establishing a narrative by positioning
stick-man type actors within the diagram. This visualisa-
tion is journalistic in the sense that it presents the con-
nections between the technological and human elements as
derived from the baseline analysis. This is also a scientific
visualisation in the sense that it is designed to function as
an expression of formal (logic based) graphical modelling,
and because it encourages the viewer to begin to explore
the connections between components, and possibly to derive
patterns of socially based information sharing or protection
practices.
4.4 The problem and the response
During the course of the case study several problems oc-
Management Briefing Participatory Diagramming Rich Picturing Rich Picturing (LEGO 1) Rich Picturing (LEGO 2)
AM (male) AM AM AM AM
WG (male)
LH (female) LH LH LH
AI (female) AI AI AI
SP (female)
NK (female/CEO)
Table 1: Participation over time. Investigators numbered between two and four at any one time, depending
on the focus of enquiry and the expert input required.
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Figure 9: Network model of the IPTV case study.
curred when using standard risk assessment methods:
• The language used by traditional information security
risk assessment was unfamiliar to the service providers.
• The standard risk assessment methods required a sin-
gle asset model which the service providers could not
produce whilst the service design was in flux.
• The service providers placed a heavy focus on the so-
cial and cultural aspects of attack and defence which
are not articulated well in standard risk assessment
methods.
Modelling that enabled participants to collaboratively cre-
ate a representation of the service and to discuss the risks
as the representation evolved was demonstrated to be a use-
ful means of overcoming these problems. After a number of
approaches were tested in the case study (as seen in Table
1), LEGO finally emerged as ‘an appropriate technology’ for
communicating information about how the service providers
see their own service design [6]. This strategic use of mixed
methods was founded by Robert Chambers, describing it as:
A growing family of approaches, methods, atti-
tudes, and behaviours to enable and empower
people to share, analyse, and enhance their knowl-
edge of life and conditions, and to plan, act, mon-
itor and evaluate.
Using LEGO the service designers were able to co-construct
a physical model of the service, discussing its attributes and
agreeing its form as they did so. LEGO is an excellent ex-
ample of a participatory research technique shown to access
‘hard-to-reach’ socio-technical data, and this data is repre-
sented through jointly or co-constructed physical models in
this instance. These models are rich in a highly project-
specific symbolic imagery that is closely attuned to IPTV
user demographics, a ‘future community-of-use’ [14].
Table 1 shows the participants’ involvement over these
sessions and the type of activities conducted. A briefing
with management established the focus of the service, and
4 workshops using critical visualisation methods followed.
The workshops were as follows:
1. Participatory Diagramming: four participants drew
the service from the perspective of their own respon-
sibilities (housing regeneration, micro-loans, and fuel-
poverty) to generate a model of core values, services
and stakeholders.
2. Rich Picturing: physical avatars were used to over-
lay an infrastructural data-flow diagram of the service
redrawn by hand to a large scale; this produced an
object/drawing matrix of the service infrastructure,
where concentric rings showed the different types of re-
lations that exist between actors, where different qual-
ities of trust and obligation are present (contractual
relationships, partnerships, collaborations, and under-
writing, for example).
3. Rich Picturing (LEGO 1): next, a specially assem-
bled LEGO kit was provided to the group. Partic-
ipants were asked to model central actors using the
colours and language of the traditional risk modelling
tool used in the baseline risk assessment. The follow-
ing representations were therefore used: technologi-
cal consumables (yellow bricks), infrastructure (green),
data (blue), and locations (pink tiles). The weighting
and positioning of elements was generally agreed upon,
and accompanied by thoughtful and insightful discus-
sions. Actor perspectives were taken from the model,
suggesting a solution for unintended consequences of
alerts, a new cross-organisational problem-solving role
(a fire-fighter standing on a blue and orange brick
tower). Verbal prompts to build were based upon the
Archimate representations, and from their own earlier
statements at the briefing (Fig. 10).
4. Rich Picturing (LEGO 2): a further LEGO session,
with three of the original participants, readdressed their
model; a new brick colour was introduced in case the
Figure 10: Rich Picturing (LEGO 1): a qualitative
shared modelling of the IPTV case study, where the
service designer’s wrestled with difficulties created
by unintended consequences of alerts.
participants should wish to add technical support mea-
sures such as encryption to vulnerable points of the
system (darker pink) (Fig. 11).
4.5 The role of critical visualisations
As it became clear that traditional risk assessment meth-
ods have limitations, arguably due to a dominant paradigm
that insists on depicting mathematical certainties, collabo-
rative modelling methods were also used. This began the
process of visualising the service design in more progressive
and creative ways. ArchiMate was used to feed representa-
tions back to the SME team, with the aim of stimulating
fresh discussions and improved visualisations of the social
aspects of risk that eluded the more traditional visualisa-
tions. This new approach was with particular reference to
any unintended social consequences (and possible interven-
tions) that could result from “alerts” triggered by clients
over-spending in particular. The detailed examination of
this scenario led to a keener understanding of the social and
organisational risks more generally. The insights that were
gained threw light upon the values and alignments that go
to make up the essential identity of the project, and which
give it its essential character as a business proposition, and
how this could be messaged effectively.
The Architect tool, an extension of the Open Group’s tax-
onomy and the ArchiMate core language, is used here as a
springboard for building constructions that stand as agreed
metaphors (or abstractions) for infrastructure [25]. By ar-
ticulating categories of objects to work with the framework
is suitable for participatory research aimed at bridging the
gaps between different modes of abstraction: inductive re-
search with qualitative data on the one hand, and techni-
cal descriptions of infrastructure on the other. The Open
Group acknowledges the pragmatic possibility of different
approaches being taken to the use of the taxonomy:
If pure qualitative values are used (i.e., values
that don’t reference a quantitative range or dis-
tribution), then the taxonomy may be used as a
Figure 11: Rich Picturing (LEGO 1): the model
can then viewed from the perspective of different
actors, and here the client has a carer at her right
shoulder, and a looming energy demand to one side
of the large TV and other technological apparatus
in front of her.
structural reference rather than a framework for
calculation [38, p. 8, our emphasis].
The structural references provided by the taxonomy and
by the graphical representations of the infrastructure, proved
to be invaluable as a means of integrating different user per-
spectives into one over-arching visualisation of IPTV. The
qualitative or organisation-centric view of IPTV that was
gained from these sessions was enhanced by developing upon
these structural references, at times exceeding upon them in
ways that were surprising and potentially useful for restruc-
turing the design of the service. At the conclusion of the
first session with LEGO the participants commented on the
process of critical visualisation:
AM: it makes it so graphic...
NK: it’s very unusual for me to be able to sit and
do something like that, because it’s, you know,
everything’s up here [finger taps head], it’s very
healthy for us, I definitely think we should get
our own LEGO kit... thing’s are captured in 3d.
4.6 Combining visualisation types
Running in parallel with this participatory research strand,
was an endeavour to re-work the IPTV scientific visualisa-
tions, using the insights gained from examining the proposed
service in its qualitative details. This graphical task was
undertaken using a prevalent scientific visual format, attack
trees (Fig. 12). Attack trees are an iconic scientific visuali-
sation as they present the results of scientific evaluation and
invite the viewer to explore the attack tree to generate at-
tack patterns using a rigorous scientific process. Although it
was clearly possible to add more technical and other infor-
mation about possible attacker-defender steps to the tree,
from an operational perspective the increasing complexity
of the trees stands in the way of immediate comprehension
and accessibility to experts and non-experts alike.
There are a number of journalistic techniques that can be
used to combat this overwhelming complexity. One is for
Figure 12: Tree-based modelling of the IPTV case
study, with steps moving upwards towards the at-
tacker’s goal. Detail of a much larger tree encom-
passing all of the known and possible attack vectors.
the user to order the paths, ranking them in different ways,
according to the difficulty and cost of individual attack-steps
towards a central goal, which is the assumed aim of an at-
tacker to ‘Steal Money’ (Fig. 13).
Another journalistic visualisation step taken to reduce the
perceived complexity of the IPTV attack tree, was to remove
intermediate nodes and creating traces of basic attack steps
out of the tree to allow an understanding of the different
possibilities captured in a tree as different sequences of at-
tack steps. This partial collapsing of often-repeated nodes,
and the grouping and simplifying of the appearance of some
branches (Fig. 14) created a hybrid scientific-journalistic
type of visualisation informed by the principles of Tufte and
Shneiderman described above. The user is able to interact
with the data at the level of detail that seems appropriate.
The attack trees, re-arranged radially and ranked by the user
of a notional graphical interface according to the number of
steps, now reflect the ease and skills required to carry out
the attack, including the monetary and resource costs, and
other dimensions that may present an accessible ‘surface’ of
opportunity to an attacker (to greater and lesser extents).
By posing fresh observations, novel representations such
as LEGO and line drawings critique the ability of traditional
representations in these areas. Scientific visualisations do
not address social practices that support organisational re-
silience, but a drawing is a suitable medium for extending
the exploratory design process that the participants of the
case study were engaged with, by representing the zones in
which information is shared by key actors (Fig. 15). An-
alysts modelled the LEGO results with their own LEGO
model, making diagrams and notes relating to key decisions
along the way (Fig. 16), or redrawing the LEGO model by
hand in order to bring out the patterns of socio-technical
practice found there, and this can be regarded as a way of
rapidly and visually prototyping an interpretation how data
can be structured to reveal embedded social practices. If so-
cial practices can be identified and studied as a visual unit
of analysis, it will be theoretically possible to make visible
their impacts upon organisational resilience [20].
These are examples of how different visualisation types
Figure 13: Radially displayed attack trees of the
IPTV scenario (image courtesy of LUST, NL).
can be brought together and hybridised to meet specific
aims. In some cases, contrasting types of visualisation can
be used by stakeholders of varied backgrounds in order to
map out their motivating concerns and to negotiate the man-
agement of these interests within a group. For example, in
the post-analysis of results of participatory engagement, it
has been useful to use a number of methods in combination
and in deliberate contrast with each other. Combining the
scientific and the critical visualisations can then result in
journalistic visualisations that are adequately equipped to
communicate the complexities of the risk narrative.
4.7 Reflections
The change in approach towards collaborative modelling
methods brought with it the advantage of preserving the ear-
lier insights gained through first briefings and the early for-
mal modelling, and brought about an extremely rich physi-
cal representation of the participants’ core business values–
which was unequivocally claimed as their own.
We adapted the risk assessment process to include an
initial exploratory stage using critical visualisation to de-
fine the service and understand the risk implications of dif-
ferent service designs. A critical perspective derived from
this stage was used at later stages in the risk assessment
to calibrate the emerging journalistic and scientific visual-
isations.This indicates that at least in some situations, a
from-the-ground-upwards or ‘blank canvas’ stage to risk as-
sessment is needed, where critical visualisations and partic-
ipatory design techniques are used to tease out the focus of
the service and the service design characteristics.
The imperatives of journalistic-style accessibility, when
combined with scientific representation and critical enquiry
upon complex scenarios, has led to remarkably ‘rich’ rep-
resentations in this case study, through which our partici-
pants have been able to follow their own interests and con-
cerns (Fig. 17). This shows how abstraction can indeed be
handled in a critical way, without necessarily impoverishing
the social aspects of visualisations, and without depending
Figure 14: The IPTV attack tree with selected
nodes collapsed into a linear path, enabling easier
manipulation and comprehension within an inter-
face (image courtesy of LUST, NL).
Figure 15: Line drawing of the IPTV co-constructed
physical model, made by the authors to show the
narrative implied by the group. The client interac-
tions with the technology are shown as a long ribbon
extending towards the goal of making a purchase
online via their TV. A dotted line represents the
extents of this practice at this point in the model
(Royal Holloway, London).
Figure 16: Security practitioner groups, notes and
diagrams carried out during modelling.
upon a sparse scientific representational paradigm to ensure
credibility and rigour. Indeed, the enriched representations
have been shown to be capable of sustaining a secondary
process of critical reflection on the meaning of these models,
and have resulted in new analyses of the social practices that
sustain a service such as IPTV (Fig. 18). These highly visual
forms of thinking and of providing feedback to participants
have been useful ways to offer new interpretations, reorgan-
ising and clustering together the central values and attitudes
that are the greatest ‘matters of concern’ to a service design
where relational services are of the utmost importance [7].
It might be argued that rich qualitative representations
have the shortcoming of not being easily understandable out-
side of the group that created them, and that a qualitative
depiction such as this requires a great deal of explanation for
it be communicated to people outside of the group, and to
convey what each of the elements represents. It is certainly
the case that the representation is constructed from an en-
tirely internal viewpoint and that the relations it contains
will only make full sense from this interior perspective, which
is both an advantage and also a limitation upon such work.
This is not to say that key messages cannot be taken from
the qualitative representations and be used towards jour-
nalistic or scientific ends, as current work analysing them is
showing. Security practitioners engaged with our evaluation
sessions using this methodology, have indicated that the de-
mand on participant’s short-term memory are outweighed
by the way in which different types of stakeholders can be
brought together by a shared visualisation to share their con-
cerns at an early stage of the design process. The physical
modelling enabled the security practitioners to share pre-
conceptions about service design and to make a record of
how they have modelled risk and other decisions relating to
their analysis, which in turn leads to clearer messaging.
5. CONCLUSION
The LEGO and drawing technique described here suc-
ceeds in making visible the qualitative dimensions of rela-
tions between actors and data in the IPTV scenario. The
method has a significant role to play in bringing these issues
to the fore, for service designers developing socio-technical
Figure 17: Rich Picturing (LEGO 2): a subsequent
session returned to the model to reflect on where ad-
ditional protection will be required, and refining the
design of the service to take account of unintended
consequences of alerts, some of which could have a
deep impact upon the real (and perceived) integrity
of the service. Divergent red lines have been added
to indicate the client’s perspective (Royal Holloway,
London).
Figure 18: A digital collage of two engagements:
Secondary interpretation of the LEGO model:
TREsPASS security analysts used LEGO to identify
where in the IPTV scenario data could be usefully
extracted and of what kind it would be. At the cen-
tre are the initial elements of the service designer’s
model, while around this are those of the secondary
analysts (Royal Holloway, London).
services in an increasingly diverse technological and social
context.
Information security is a complex, multi-dimensional topic
that combines the experiential with the scientific. This pa-
per calls for a greater breadth of practices in the develop-
ment of visualisations in the service of better representing
the complexities of information security. For the science of
security to progress, it must be able to accommodate alter-
native paradigms, to revive Kuhn’s term again, that chal-
lenge existing ones. In the era of ‘big data’ visualisation,
critical visualisation is needed to re-examine the claims of
transparency, certainty, and objectivity that are typically
embedded in the Cartesian language of the genre. It is this
type of language that is used in the information security
visualisations presented in the security reports mentioned
above (Section 3).
Critical visualisation opens a door through which user or
viewer-led enquiry can enter and the discourse related to
information security can be widened. In particular, critical
visualisations play a key role in the early stages of risk as-
sessment when the service design has yet to be fully defined.
It is the insistence on the situatedness of visualisation: the
triangular relationship between observer, the phenomenon
being observed, and the audience, that enables service de-
signers to reflect on the nature of the service and the impli-
cations for security risk. Once this is reinforced, it can be
scrutinised as a work of rhetoric, or as Latour would argue,
as a “matter of concern” rather than a “matter of fact” [26].
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